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Vaccination has been deemed the most cost-effective way to fight against preventable diseases 
and improve global health. In recent years, expensive combination vaccines which provide 
multiple antigens in a single shot have been developed to replace traditional monovalent 
vaccines and have become the preferred choice of healthcare systems in industrialized countries. 
High prices have not only barricaded low-income countries from accessing combination vaccines 
but also lure vaccine manufacturers to shift their production capacity from making traditional 
vaccines to combination vaccines. Such a shift could eventually lead to shortages on the vaccine 
supply for low-income countries. This work extends the ABP model proposed by Proaño [18] 
which optimally prices vaccines under tiered pricing strategy to make them affordable and 
available across different market segments. This thesis first introduces a heuristic method to 
solve the ABP. Second, this thesis presents an optimization model to decide the minimum 
amount of subsidy needed to make an expensive combination vaccine affordable to people in a 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 1 of the thesis introduces the history of vaccination 
and the current state of global immunization, and describes existing problems in the global 
vaccine market. Section 1 also introduces the Antigen Bundle Pricing (ABP) problem developed 
by Proano [18], which aims to optimize the allocation and pricing of vaccine in the global 
market. Section 2 presents a heuristic approach to solve the ABP problem as well as some 
enhancements on the original ABP model.  Section3 presents an optimization model to determine 
the minimum subsidy required in order to support the immunization needs of a developing 
country. The solution resulted from the heuristics approach in Section 2 can be used as input data 
for the optimization model in Section 3. 
 
1.1 A brief history of vaccines and immunization 
Among medical treatments, immunization is considered the most cost effective way to fight 
diseases [1]. On average, each dollar invested in immunization saves up to $USD 27 of health 
expenses [1]. Currently immunization can protect people from a wide range of diseases; and 
readily available vaccines can be used to prevent up to 25 diseases worldwide, many of which 
are fatal or could result in severe disabilities [2].  
Throughout human history, epidemics have been one of the major enemies of mankind. 
For example, smallpox and tuberculosis, killed nearly 30% of all new-born children in ancient 
China [4]. In 1918, the first recorded influenza pandemic killed over 40 million people all over 
the world [3]. Solely in China and during the 20
th
 century, it is estimated that hundreds of 
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thousands of children have been paralyzed due to polio [4]. Influenza strains such as H5N1 and 
the newly emerged H1N1 have challenged public health care systems around the globe, resulting 
in massive financial costs and major public concern.  
Vaccines introduce weak or killed antigenic materials into the human body in order to 
stimulate the immunity system so that it would effectively react upon a future infection [1]. The 
first believed attempt of vaccination occurred in India and China 200BC, where people tried to 
prevent smallpox by purposely getting in contact with cowpox infected patients [5]. In the late 
18
th
 century, British physician Edward Jenner applied cowpox on humans to prevent smallpox. 
His attempts were effective and marked the beginning of modern vaccination [7]. Louis Pasteur 
later developed techniques that lead to vaccines protecting against bacterial anthrax and viral 
rabies [8]. Nowadays, most of the infectious diseases that used to threaten humanity can be 
effectively prevented through vaccination.  The currently proposed immunization schedule in 
USA protects children against 16 diseases, not including seasonal influenza [9, 10]. Similarly, 
most countries around the world maintain immunization schedules based on their national health 
needs.  
The global application of vaccines has been highly successful. The eradication of 
smallpox was achieved in 1979 [5]. Poliomyelitis endemics are now occurring only in four 
countries (Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and Nigeria), with less than 1,600 reported cases annually 
[11]. Additionally, general vaccination efforts have decrease the occurrence of measles and it 
seems to become the next disease to be eradicated [1, 26]. 
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1.2 Advent of combination vaccine and its impact to vaccine industry 
Before 1990s, all vaccines accessible to the public were monovalent vaccines, which provide 
protection against one disease. As new types of vaccines were developed and integrated in the 
national immunization requirements, the immunization schedules became very congested. For 
example, in order to receive all required vaccines exclusively through monovalent vaccines, a 
child in the USA would have to receive 24 injections before age 2 [9]. 
In the last 20 years, new vaccines have been developed that can simultaneously provide 
protection against multiple diseases in one injection. These new vaccines, commonly referred as 
combination vaccines, have soon become the preferred choice for parents and pediatricians 
because of the fewer injections and clinic visits needed to fully immunize a child. For instance, 
using available combination vaccines a child in the USA only needs 11 injections before age 2 to 
receive full protection based on immunization schedule [9]. Due to this customer preference, 
combination vaccines are expensive and provide vaccine manufacturers an opportunity to 
increase their profit. In the year 1990, the global vaccine market value was only $USD 2.9 
billion [21]. By the year 2008, due to the introduction of new combination vaccines, the 
estimated value of global vaccine market increased to $USD 20.5 billion [21].  
Due to their high price and licensing restrictions, new combinatorial vaccines are not 
accessible to people in developing countries. Therefore, the immunization requirements of 
people in the poorest developing countries mainly rely on simple (often monovalent) traditional 
vaccines. This has lead to a divergence on the type of vaccines consumed in industrialized 
countries and low-income developing countries. Moreover, the high profit margin provided by 
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the sale of combination vaccines has driven vaccine manufacturers to shift production capacity 
from less-expensive traditional vaccines to combination vaccines [14].  
Evidence has shown that for some of the poorest countries in Africa, although their 
economies have expanded in the past years, their immunization status has actually deteriorated. 
In sub-Saharan African countries, immunization coverage dropped from 55% in year 1990 to 
53% in year 2000 [12]. Extreme cases are the Central African Republic and Republic of  Congo, 
where immunization coverage dropped respectively from 79% and 82% in year 1990 to 33% and 
29% in year 2000 [12]. It is estimated that in 2000, about 33 million children worldwide missed 
out on routine immunization during their first year of life due to shortage of vaccine supplies 
[12]. Until the year 2005, there were still more than 50 countries with the “under 5 mortality rate 
(U5MR)” higher than 100 per 1000 birth, with 90% of these casualties due to vaccine 
preventable diseases [15]. 
 
1.3 Tiered pricing strategy in global vaccine market 
Since their establishment, the World Health Organization (WHO), as well as the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), has made major efforts to support proper immunization systems for 
low-income countries, especially in Africa and Southeast Asia. In 2000, the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) was launched as a joint effort of the United Nations 
agencies, governments, foundations, donors and academic institutions. In vaccine market, GAVI 
and UNICEF are considered as altruist organizations that purchase vaccines from manufacturers 
and distribute vaccines to developing countries. In year 2009, UNICEF purchased 2.9 billion 
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doses of vaccines for children in 82 countries, which consists of 40 percent of global vaccine 
purchase in 2009 [15].  
GAVI and UNICEF purchase and distribute large amount of vaccines, as a result they 
have enormous bargain power on both sides of the market. A tiered pricing system had been used 
by UNICEF since 1970s for the distribution of vaccines [17]. Tiered pricing system refers to the 
pricing strategy in which different groups of customers are charged different prices for the same 
product. In the context of vaccines, low-income countries are charged a reduced price compared 
with buyers from developed countries [23]. The pneumococcal vaccine, for instance, has been 
provided by GAVI to low-income countries at $USD 3.5 per dose, which is one tenth of the 
average price in developed countries [24]. 
Under the tiered pricing policy, vaccine consumers in poorer countries are subsidized by 
vaccine buyers from industrialized countries, which seems to be unfair. However, analysts and 
researchers such as Plahte [17] have pointed out that this tiered pricing system in fact results in a 
win-win-win situation. Plahte [17] reasoned that a tiered pricing system removes the price barrier 
which otherwise prevents poor countries from accessing vaccines. As a result, under a tiered 
pricing policy, the vaccine manufacturers face an expanded market and can recover faster their 
research and development cost (R&D cost), which is the largest portion of vaccine 
manufacturing cost. Plahte [17] also claimed that in tiered pricing, consumers in developed 
countries are charged lower prices per dose of vaccine. 
 
6 
1.4 Antigen Bundle Pricing (ABP) model  
Given that vaccines are distributed under tiered pricing, then a challenge arises when a wide 
variety of combination vaccines are available in the market. To provide protection against a set 
of diseases, one can use only monovalent vaccines, use both monovalent vaccines and 
combination vaccines, or use solely combination vaccines. Based on the income level, customers 
in different countries may have different preferences for each type of vaccine. As a result, a 
decision has to be made on how to allocate and price vaccines among different countries to 
achieve maximum total benefit for the entire market. 
To answer these questions, Proano [18] proposes the Antigen Bundle Pricing (ABP) 
optimization model. The ABP model generates solutions revealing optimal vaccine allocation 
between vaccine buyers and manufacturers, and suggests a set of vaccines prices. The optimal 
vaccine allocation generated by the ABP model is referred as ABP allocation. ABP allocation 
maximizes the overall financial benefit gained by all members of the vaccine market while 
ensuring that each country satisfies their immunization needs, supply capacity is respected, and 
by considering vaccine price elasticity. The vaccine price generated by the ABP model 
guarantees that vaccines will be provided to customers affordably, while all manufacturers are 
guaranteed a minimum profit. 
 
1.4.1 Concepts in the ABP model 
The ABP model is based on a hypothetical vaccine market. The following concepts have 
been utilized when building the vaccine market in the ABP model. 
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(a). Market segments 
Every country in the world needs vaccines. The ABP model divides the global vaccine 
market into market segments based on income level.  Countries in the same market segment are 
assumed to have the same reservation price for each type of vaccine. Reservation price is 
referred as the maximum amount of money that a market segment is willing to pay for a vaccine 
dose.  
(b). Antigen bundles 
The ABP model treats vaccines as indivisible bundles of antigens. A monovalent vaccine 
is considered as a bundle containing only one type of antigen. A bundle cannot contain more 
than one dose of each type of antigen. Figure 2 shows some examples of antigen bundles.  
 
 
In the ABP model, immunization demand of market segments is expressed on antigen 
units. The demand is satisfied by purchasing vaccine bundles containing the demanded antigens. 


















Figure 1: Illustration on antigen bundles 
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antigens increases. If   denotes the number of different antigens available and   represents the 
number of all possible different types of bundles, then   corresponds to       .  
(c). Vaccine manufacturers 
In the ABP model, each vaccine manufacturer is capable of providing a set of vaccine 
bundles. Since expanding vaccine production capacity is expensive and lengthy, each 
manufacturer is assumed to have a fixed production capacity for each type of vaccine bundle 
they produce. A high R&D cost is always needed for the prolonged development phase of a 
vaccine. Additionally, vaccines are generally produced in large batches and the marginal 
production cost per dose can be insignificant. In fact, the production cost per dose of most live-
attenuated vaccines is on the order of pennies of $USD [6]. Therefore, the ABP model assumes 
that the most significant production cost for a manufacturer results from R&D cost to develop a 
bundle. It is also assumed that a manufacturer decides to produce a bundle only when it is 
profitable. 
(d). Total social surplus 
Total social surplus (TSS) reflects the total benefit gained by all entities across the 
vaccine market through vaccine trading. The ABP model assumes that intermediate 
organizations like GAVI and UNICEF are altruist and do not withhold benefit during vaccine 
trading. Therefore, TSS equals the aggregation on the total profit earned by all manufacturers 
and total customer surplus obtained by all market segments. The total profit is calculated by 
subtracting production cost from total revenue. The total customer surplus is defined as the 
aggregate difference between customer’s reservation price of a bundle and the bundle's actual 
selling price. 
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1.4.2 Formulation of the ABP model.  
This section describes the mathematical formulation of ABP model as well as its 
notations. 
(a). Sets. 
    Set of all antigens 
    Set of all antigen bundles 
    Set of all market segments 
    Set of all vaccine producers 
       Set of antigens provided by bundle    , with         
       Set of antigens required by market segment   , with         
       Bundles that supply antigen    , with         
       Bundles manufactured by  producer    , with         
        Subset of bundles in       that, when combined together, provide an  
equivalent antigen offering to bundle        ,      
        Set of all possible subset of bundles        for        ,     
(b). Parameters 
     Reservation price of bundle     in market segment    
    Annual number of children born per year in market    
      Annual cost that needs to be recovered for bundle     manufactured by 
  producer     
      Number of units of antigen     required to provide full immunity to a  
  child in market segment     
10 
      Binary parameter indicating access limitation of market segments on  
  bundles.       if bundle     is accessible to market segment   ;  
        otherwise 
      Production capacity for producer     to produce bundle     
      Maximum number of doses of bundle     that could be administered to  
  a child in market segment    to avoid over immunization 
                                
     Scaling constant used to model vaccine demand elasticity 
(c). Variables  
       The number of doses of bundle    , supplied by vaccine producer  
      and offered to market segment   . The values of variable      
in the solution gives the vaccine allocation in the market 
       Price per dose of bundle    , supplied by vaccine producer     and  
  offered to market segment    
      Binary variable corresponds to production plan of vaccine producers.  
        if vaccine producer     decide to manufacture bundle    ;  
        otherwise. 
(d). Formulation 
The ABP model maximizes the total benefit obtained across the vaccine market, which is 
reflected by total social surplus (TSS) generated during vaccine trading. The TSS is comprised of 
two components which are the total profit earned by vaccine manufacturer and the total customer 
surplus obtained by market segments.  
The total profit (TP) corresponds to the aggregated revenue minus the aggregated cost, 
and is given by equation (1.4.1). The total customer surplus (TCS) is calculated by aggregating 
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over each sold bundle on the difference between the reservation price of the buyer and the actual 
selling price. Equation (1.4.2) gives the formulation for total customer surplus. The total social 
surplus is the sum of the total profit and the total customer surplus, which is given by (1.4.3). 
              
         
         
      
                  
                     
         
                  
              
         
         
      
                  
Equation (1.4.4) gives the objective function of the ABP model. 
                   
         
         
      
                  




                   
         
         
      
                                                                         
                          
        
                                                   
                                                   
      
                  
                                                                                             
     
   
                                                                                                                       
         
   
                                                                                                             
                 
    
    
 
 
                                                                     
                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                   




1.4.3 The optimal bundle prices 
Proano [18] show that the objective function of the ABP model given by (1.4.4) does not 
include the price variables      and therefore TSS is independent on the value of bundle prices. 
So maximizing the TSS leads to a solution which gives optimal bundle allocation and optimal 
bundle production plan. However, the resulting prices corresponding to such bundle allocation 
are just feasible values. The bundle prices have major impact on the share of profit and customer 
surplus in the TSS. For a given vaccine allocation consumers are harmed when prices are set too 
high, while manufacturers lose profit if the prices are set too low. Therefore, in order to find out 
the appropriate value of bundle price that benefits vaccine producers and market segments, a two 
stage method is applied. 
The first stage solves the ABP model and the solution gives the optimal bundle 
allocation      
  as well as the optimal production plan     
 . Then in the second stage, the 
resulting     
  and     
  for all bundles, markets and producers are used as input parameters for 
two optimization models, ABP_PF and ABP_CS. The solution of ABP_PF model and ABP_CS 
model respectively provides the upper bound and lower bound for the feasible bundle prices, for 
which the ABP bundle allocation     
  is still optimal. 
(a). The ABP_PF model 
The objective function of the ABP_PF model maximizes the total profit which is 
expressed by equation (1.4.1).  Since     
  and    
  are parameters, the only variable in the 
ABP_PF model is vector of      containing the bundle prices for each possible bundle 
allocation. Therefore the value of         
 
       is always a constant and can be omitted 
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from the objective function of the ABP_PF model. Equation (1.4.13) provides the objective 
function for the ABP_PF model. 
                
     
         
                   
The ABP_PF model must also satisfy all constraints from the original ABP model so that 
the bundle price generated combined with the optimal bundle allocation is still feasible for the 
original ABP model. In the ABP model, constraints (1.4.6), (1.4.7) and (1.4.12) do not contain 
pricing variables. Since the values of     
  and    
 are optimal values to the ABP model, it is 
guaranteed that these constraints are already satisfied from the input allocation vector, and hence 
they could be omitted. Constraint (1.4.5) can also be ignored since the value of each    
 is known 
and treated as a constant in the second stage models. The resulting formulation is presented as 
following. 
Formulation: The ABP_PF Model 
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The solution generated by ABP_PF model is denoted by all     . The value of each 
     gives the upper bound of bundle prices for a given ABP optimal allocation     
  and    
 . 
 
(b). The ABP_CS model 
Opposite to ABP_PF, the ABP_CS model maximizes the total customer surplus obtained 
by market segments, which is given by equation (1.4.2a). 
              
         
            
         
                   
Only ABP constraints that contain bundle pricing variables      are included in the 
ABP_CS model. The formulation of the ABP_CS model is presented as follows. 
Formulation: The ABP_CS Model 
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Since     
  and    
  are input parameters, the value of           
 
          is 
constant and can be removed from (1.4.18). So (1.4.18) can be converted to (1.4.19) as below. 
                
     
         
                   
Therefore, the solution of the ABP_CS model gives the value of      which is the lower 
bound for bundle prices for a given ABP optimal allocation     
  and    
 . 
 
(c). Construct the optimal prices for the ABP model 
Let   and   be the vectors which contain all elements of      and      given by 
ABP_PF and ABP_CS. Any bundle prices within the range defined by   and  , when combined 
with the optimal allocation     
  and    
  , form an optimal solution to the original ABP model. 
The optimal price is defined as a linear combination of   and  , which is given by equation 
(1.4.20). Figure 3 illustrates how the bundle price is calculated. 
                                      
In (1.4.20), the value of   determines for a given optimal bundle allocation, whether the 
prices will benefit more to vaccine producers or to market segments. For         , the 
market segments obtain a greater customer surplus while the vaccine produces receive reduced 
amount of profit. For        , the solution benefits more on vaccine producers.       
implies that market segments and vaccine producers split the total social surplus generated 













  and    
Solve ABP _PF 
model with    and 
   as input 
 
Solve ABP _CS 
model with    and 




             
  ,    and    forms 
the ABP solution. 
 
Figure 3: Illustration on how the ABP model is solved 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
  generated by ABP_PF 
  generated by ABP_CS 
Bundle Price:             
The range of bundle 
price which is feasible 
to the ABP model 
Figure 2: How to calculate bundle price 
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1.5 A brief literature review 
Vaccine availability in developing countries has become a serious issue and has raised concerns 
of scholars in the area of economics, public policy as well as operations research for the past 10 
year. There has been significant research related to this area. In one paper, Wilson, P. [6] pointed 
out that the drop in vaccine availability in developing countries is due to the high prices of new 
vaccines which hinder their use in developing countries. He also argued that by employing tiered 
pricing, vaccine producers can offer vaccines to developing countries at significant discounts, 
and thus enable wider coverage of new vaccines. The tiered pricing strategy is further studied by 
Plahte, J. [17], who shows in his article that tiered pricing is not necessarily a process in which 
industrialized countries merely subsidize vaccine consumers in developing countries. Plahte [17] 
shows that compared with single pricing, tiered pricing system leads to a win-win-win situation 
in which consumers from industrialized countries and developing countries all receive increased 
benefit, while vaccine manufacturers gain higher profits. Assuming tiered pricing of vaccines, 
Proano [18] presents an O.R. based approach to allocate and price vaccine optimally. The 
optimal vaccine allocation guarantees the maximization on the total social welfare obtained by 
vaccine consumers as well as producers. The optimal allocation also guarantees that new-born 
children in all countries can be vaccinated affordably, while vaccine producers can have desired 
profit by selling vaccines to developing countries. Pricing of vaccines has been studied by other 
scholars such as McGuire, T. [22] who in his paper discusses how to use an economics model to 
set the prices of new vaccines based on the potential cost, probability of R&D success as well as 
the prospective benefit that a consumer can have by using the vaccine. Danzon and Towse [28] 
analyze the use of Ramsey price to decide pharmaceuticals prices under price discrimination 
rule. Oddone [29] discusses in his paper about cost-benefit of vaccine R&D; Kremer [30] as well 
19 
as Jessing and R. Nuscheler [31] analyze how governments should intervene in vaccine markets. 
These discussions are limited to monovalent vaccines. 
There have also been papers talking about the effects of subsidy on vaccine availability of 
developing countries. In his paper, Hinman, AR. [27] pointed out that a stable reimbursement 
system is essentially important for maintaining a high immunization rate for children below 35 
month as well as people over 65 years old. Kemp and Nagishi [32] has analyzed the effects of 
subsidy in international commercial. Behrman [33] discusses the importance of subsidy in 




2. CHAPTER 1: A HEURISTIC APPROACH TO SOLVE THE ABP 
PROBLEM 
The ABP is a Mixed-Integer Non-Linear Problem, which Proano [18] proved to be NP-hard. 
Thus this thesis presents a heuristics method to approximate the optimal solution of ABP 
problem. When the ABP model solves for only one bundle type or a small subset of bundle 
types, the required solution time is greatly reduced. Therefore, the heuristic determines a near 
optimal bundle allocation by solving a sequence of small problems in which one-bundle is solved 
at a time. The sequence at which these problems are solved has been carefully crafted so that the 
allocations of bundles that have higher contributions to the TSS are solved first. 
Combination bundles are preferred over monovalent bundles by customers in all markets 
segments. As a result, when receiving combination bundles, market segments always obtain high 
customer surplus. The high reservation price on combination vaccines allows manufacturers to 
charge higher price and increase profit. As a result, combination vaccines always generate higher 
total social surplus than monovalent vaccines. 
Therefore, the heuristic approach to be presented in this thesis solves the ABP model 
iteratively, with only one type of combination bundle solved in each iteration. After the ABP 
iterations solves for all the combination bundles, the remaining unmet demand will be satisfied 
by allocating monovalent bundles. The corresponding model for the heuristics method is a 
reduced version of the original ABP model, here referred as the ABP_R(i) model, where index   
represents the type of bundle solved in each iteration. 
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2.1 Assumptions of the ABP_R(i) model 
The ABP_R(i) model solves the same problem as the ABP model. Therefore, the assumptions 
taken by the ABP model are also applicable to the ABP_R(i) model. However, there are risks 
associated with the iterative approach of the ABP_R(i) model, which need to be mitigated by 
additional assumption. 
When solving ABP_R(i) for a bundle   in iteration  , the model tries to maximize total 
social surplus by allocating as many doses of bundle   as possible, regardless of any iteration that 
comes after  . Since vaccine demand is iteratively updated based on ABP_R(i) solution, it is 
possible that after iteration  , the residual demand becomes infeasible for all future iterations. 
Therefore, a problem that is feasible for the ABP model could be infeasible for the ABP_R(i) 
model. Figure 4 shows such an example. The scenario contains two customers   and   as 
well as three types of antigen A, B and C. The demands of customers on antigens are shown in 
Figure 5. The bundles available are two doses each of bundle     and    as well as one dose 
each of bundle    and   .  
From Figure 4, it can be seen that when all three types of bundle are solved 
simultaneously which imitates the ABP approach, a feasible bundle allocation exists which 
allocates two doses of bi-antigen bundles to each customer. However for the same scenario, 
assume ABP_R(i) solves for tri-antigen bundle     in the 1st iteration since it is the most 
complex bundle, then one dose of bundle     is allocated to each customer. Consequently, the 
residual demand is one dose of   for   and one dose of   for  , which cannot be satisfied by 





In order to mitigate such a risk, the ABP_R(i) model takes an assumption that the supply 
of monovalent bundles is unlimited. This is a fair assumption since in reality, the production 
process of monovalent bundles is much cheaper and simpler, and therefore the production 
capacity of monovalent bundles can be promptly expanded by vaccine manufactureres. The new 
assumption guarantees the feasibility of the ABP_R(i) model since even in the worst case when 
no combination bundle is allocable, the vaccine demand can still be satisfied by allocating 
monovalent bundles. 
 
   
   
   
       
Demand 
ABP allocation (feasible) ABP_R(i) allocation (infeasible) 
       
Demand    
   
   
    
    
   
   
   
   
    
    
Figure 4: Example when the ABP_R(i) approach fails to generate feasible solution 
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2.2 Formulation of the ABP_R(i) model 
In the ABP model, set   corresponds to the set of bundles. In the ABP_R(i) model, set   is 
divided into the following two sets. 
                                 
                              
Compared with the ABP model, ABP_R(i) model includes one additional ordered set. 
                                           
The ABP_R(i) model assumes that in iteration  , the only available bundle type in the 
market is  . However, when     , the production capacity of bundle   is limited. So it is very 
unlikely that the amount of available combination bundle   satisfies demand from all market 
segments. Therefore, in the ABP_R(i) formulation, constraint (1.4.6) in the ABP model which 
enforces demand satisfactory must be replaced by its relaxation given by equation (2.2.2). 
      
                    
                                    
Additionally, it is impossible to compare the utilities of different types of bundles in 
different market segments when solving ABP_R(i) for one bundle at a time. Therefore constraint 
(1.4.5) in the original ABP model is ignored in the formulation of the ABP_R(i) model.  
All the other constraints from the ABP model are kept in the ABP_R(i) model. The 
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2.3 The Sorting Criteria 
The heuristics approach behind the ABP_R(i) model is essentially a greedy approach which 
disaggregates the set of bundles into smaller subsets and iteratively solves each subset. Different 
types of combination bundles, when allocated to market segments, can generate different amount 
of total social surplus. Therefore, when ABP_R(i) model maximizes the total social surplus in 
each iteration, the final TSS generated after all bundles are solved may not be optimal. For 
instance, assume that there exists a polyvalent bundle with high volume of supply while 
generates very low TSS. If this bundle is allocated to all market segments in an early ABP_R(i) 
iteration and satiates all demands, then the final TSS is impaired since other bundles more 
capable of generating TSS are blocked in following iterations.  
Therefore, to ensure the maximization on TSS, it is important to define the sequence by 
which different bundles are solved by ABP_R(i) so that bundles generating lower TSS do not 
take precedence over bundles generating higher TSS.  
From equation (1.4.3) in previous section, it is clear that when a producer decides to 
provide a bundle (i.e.       , then the TSS generated by      results from the reservation 
price that customers in different markets have on the bundle as well as the development cost 
required for producing the bundle. A bundle that is more preferred by customers (i.e. higher 
value of    ) and requires less development investment per dose (lower value of        ) would 
results in higher TSS. As a result, we propose sorting all bundles by descending values of      as 
expressed by (2.3.1). Then the polyvalent bundle with higher values of      is considered more 
capable of generating TSS and will be solved in earlier iteration of ABP_R(i).  
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In equation (2.3.1),      represents the priority of bundle to be solved in ABP_R(i).     
represents the residual demand at market segments  for bundle   up to the current iteration. 
Figure 5 illustrates the procedure of using the ABP_R(i) model to allocate bundles. 
 
 
The ABP_R(i) model substitutes the ABP model only to generate bundle allocation 
variable     
  as well as bundle production variable    
 . Then the ABP_PF and ABP_CS 
models can be used to get bundle prices as described in sub-section 1.4.3. 
 
Initialization: assign 
priority to all bundles 
in    based on (2.3.1) 
Include   into   where   
being the bundle with 
highest priority in    
Remove   
from    
Solve the 
ABP_R(i) model 
      
N 
Update    and    
based on the 
allocation of bundle   
Update antigen demand     
and residual bundle demand 
   for all market segments 
Satisfy the unmet 
antigen demand 
with bundles in MB 
Update 
   and     
 
Final allocation    
and production plan 
   obtained 
 
Y 
Update priority of all 
bundles in    based on 
the new value of     
market segments 
Remove   
from   
Figure 5: Illustration on how ABP_R(i) generates bundle allocation 
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2.4 Computational results 
 In order to compare the performance of the original ABP model and the ABP_R(i) model, this 
thesis experiments on the two models using the same input data. The data used in this thesis was 
originally provided by Proano [18]. Figure 6, 7, 8 and 9 present experiment data in detail. 
 
Figure 6: Bundles supplied by manufacturers 
Figure 6 shows that the experiment data contains 15 different types of vaccine bundle 
provided by 3 vaccine manufacturers. There are 4 market segments in the experiment; Figure 7 
provides information on each of the market segment. Based on their income levels, different 
market segments have different reservation prices on each type of bundle, which is described in 
Figure 8, which also describes the supply capacity of each bundle. In order to have full 
protection, a child needs to receive multiple doses of the same antigen. The number of doses of 







Figure 7: Description of market segments 
Figure 8: Reservation prices and supply features of different bundles 
Figure 9: Number of doses needed to provide full immunization to a child 
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Solving the problem using the original ABP model requires around 3,000 seconds of 
solution time when using KNITRO as the solver. When using the ABP_R(i) approach, the time 
needed to solve the same problem is 10 seconds, which is 1/300 compared with the original ABP 
model. 
When the supply of bundle 15 (DtaP-HBV-HiB-IPV, which is the most complex vaccine 
in the data example) equals to 175 million doses, the total social surplus generated by the ABP 
optimal solution is around USD$ 16.451 billion. For the ABP_R(i) approach, the total social 
surplus generated equals to $USD 16.440 billion which corresponds to a decreases of 0.07% 
compared with the original ABP model.  
 
Figure 10: ABP allocation vs. ABP_R(i) allocation 
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Figure 10 shows vaccine allocations generated by the original ABP model and the 
ABP_R(i) approach. The black bar corresponds to the ABP allocation while grey bar 
corresponds to the ABP_R(i) allocation. The up arrow and down arrow show the range of bundle 
prices that are feasible for the resulting ABP allocation. The supply of bundle 15 is 175 million 
for the problem instance solved in Figure 10. 
From Figure 10, it can be observed that for most of the bundles, the ABP allocation and 
ABP_R(i) allocation are consistent. Therefore, the ABP_R(i) model generates vaccine bundle 





3. CHAPTER 2: THE SWAP MODEL TO SOLVE THE SUBSIDY 
PROBLEM 
In order to improve the health condition of women and children in developing countries, a key 
component is to improve their vaccines accessibilities. Although optimization models such as 
ABP and the heuristics presented in this thesis can determine vaccine tiered prices that reduce 
their costs, several vaccines may still remain unaffordable to the poorest countries. As a result, 
vaccine subsidies are necessary to make a vaccine commercially attractive in an otherwise 
unprofitable market. For example, the price per dose of pneumococcal vaccines is offered at 
$USD 3.50 in low-income countries while at more than $USD 90 in the U.S. Within the $USD 
3.50, only less than $USD 0.3 is paid by consumers in low-income countries, while GAVI 
provides financial support to cover the remaining $USD 3.2 [15].   
 In 2006, UNICEF proposed the Global Immunization Vision and Strategy (GIVS), 
which aimed to reduce the vaccine-preventable disease mortality by two-thirds by year 2015 
compared with year 2000 [20]. However, to realize this ambitious goal, $USD 15 billion of 
funding needs to be raised before year 2015 [20]. These funds were to be spent on aiding the 
developing countries purchasing vaccines and injection supplies, building up sanitation and 
hygienic facilities as well as hiring medical personnel. Current donations for vaccines are 
primarily contributed by private foundations, governments and individual philanthropists. In 
2009, GAVI had cumulatively received and spent $USD 4.5 billion since its establishment in 
2000. Meanwhile, a further $USD 4 billion funding has been committed until year 2015 which 
aimed at improving immunization programs in 72 of the poorest countries [26].  From the year 
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2000 to 2009, the amount of money GAVI has spent on purchasing or subsidizing vaccines for 
developing countries accounts for 65% of its total expenditure [26].  
Cold chain is required in the transportation and storage of vaccines, which is not 
available in poor countries. Therefore, providing subsidy to allow the use of combination 
vaccines in developing countries is valuable because the required logistics expenditure can be 
greatly reduced. Since there are limitations on the total available funding, it is valuable for 
donors and organizations such as GAVI to determine the minimum subsidy needed by individual 
developing countries, and therefore expand the global immunization. This chapter presents an 
optimization model to determine the minimum subsidy needed to ensure that allocating a 
complex combination vaccine to a low-income country is commercially attractive. However, 
given that the production capacity of vaccine manufacturers is limited, introducing a complex 
vaccine in a poor country impacts the available supply of several vaccines in other countries, and 
it could even results in a change of vaccine allocation for the whole vaccine market. Therefore, 
the optimization model presented in this chapter simultaneously maximizes the total social 
surplus of entire vaccine market when such an allocation change occurs. 
The first section of the chapter introduces the general background and basic assumptions 
of the subsidy model. Section 2 presents a procedure to allow poor markets to have complex 
vaccines. In Section 3, a two stage goal programming approach is presented which decides 
vaccine allocation that requires minimum subsidy and meanwhile maximizes TSS. Section 4 
presents the computational results. Section 5 discusses the extension of the problem to 
accommodate scenarios in which external producers can provide additional supply of vaccines.  
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3.1 Background and assumptions in the subsidy problem  
Any vaccine bundle allocation results in certain amount of total social surplus. If the allocation 
corresponds to the solution of the ABP model, then it generates maximum TSS [18]. Consider a 
bundle allocation characterized as follows. 
 A complex and expensive vaccine bundle B is not allocated to a low-income market 
segment, M. 
 The supply capacity of bundle B is tight, which means that all the allocable amount of 
bundle B has been totally assigned to some of the market segments. 
 The supply capacity for producing bundle B cannot be expanded within a short time 
frame. 
Furthermore, assume that the low-income market segment M must be satisfied with K 
doses of bundle B. This implies that the original allocation needs to be changed to accommodate 
K doses of bundle B to market segment M. Since bundle B is expensive for market M and it is in 
short supply, allocating bundle B to market M would become attractive to manufacturers only 
when additional external funding becomes available. The amount of money from a third party 
donor that is needed to induce a change on bundle allocation so that an otherwise non-allocated 
bundle becomes available to market M is referred as a subsidy.  
For market segment M to receive K doses of bundle B, there must be market segments 
that would give up some of their bundle B. If originally bundle B is allocated to a single market 
segment N, the problem simply consists in determining the dollar amount that will reduce 
allocation of bundle B to market N by K doses. However, when bundle B is initially allocated to 
34 
multiple market segments, then a decision has to be made on how many doses each market 
segment should contribute to make up the K doses of bundle B demanded by market M. Figure 
11 illustrates the two cases described above. 
 
 
The shuffling of vaccine bundles among market segments results in a new vaccine 
allocation and eventually leads to a change on the TSS level. If the initial bundle allocation is not 
optimized, then it is possible that the new allocation supersedes the original allocation by 
generating a higher TSS. However, in case when the initial allocation corresponds to an ABP 
optimal allocation, then any change to it is guaranteed to lead to a lower TSS. In both situations, 
it is straight forward that the TSS generated by the new bundle allocation needs to be maximized. 
External subsidy is needed to support allocating expensive complex bundles to low-











Simpler case: bundle B is 
allocated only to market 
segment N in the original 
allocation. 
More complex case: bundle B is 
allocated to several market 
segments in original allocation. 
Figure 11: Two situations on vaccine distribution 
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desirable for donors to know the minimum amount of subsidy needed. Therefore, the problem of 
determining the new allocation that leads to maximum TSS while requiring minimum level of 
subsidy money is referred as the subsidy problem. 
3.2 Introduction on the swap procedure  
This thesis proposes an optimization model to solve the subsidy problem. The model starts from 
an initial vaccine allocation, in which each market segments has already secured the supply of a 
given amount of vaccine bundles. (Poorer market segments may not necessarily satisfy all their 
immunization needs.) Then the model allows market segments to swap vaccine bundles between 
each other. For each swapped bundle, a provider and a receiver is involved. The price of a bundle 
is considered as an inherent attribute of the bundle, so when a bundle is swapped, the receiver 
market segment is charged the same price for that bundle as the provider market segment. The 
model terminates with a new bundle allocation. In the new allocation, one market segment may 
obtain bundles that originally belonged to others, while some of its originally owned bundles are 
now offered to another market segment. However, the new allocation must guarantee that   
doses of expensive combination bundle   are allocated to the target low-income market 
segment . 
It is possible that for a swapped bundle, the price at which the provider originally pays 
for it exceeds the reservation price of its receiver. Since price is inherent to the bundle, now the 
price of this bundle becomes higher than the reservation price of the receiver and therefore 
inhibits the receiver from accessing the bundle. In such situations, a subsidy can help the receiver 
by artificially increasing its reservation price for the expensive bundle and therefore permitting 
the swap. 
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The following paragraphs present a simple example about how the bundles are swapped 
between two market segments. The example also depicts how a subsidy can be used when 
swapping expensive bundles to low-income markets that cannot afford them. In the example, it is 
assumed that there are two types of antigens, A and B, and hence there are three different types 
of vaccine bundles: A, B and AB. All the bundles are offered by a single producer. It is also 
assumed that there is a high-income market segment R and a low-income market segment P. 
Market R demands 6 units of antigen A and 5 units of antigen B while market P demands 4 units 
of antigen A and 4 units of antigen B. The production capacities of bundles as well as the 
reservation prices of the market segments over bundles are described as in Figure 12. 
 
The example starts with an initial vaccine allocation in which both of the market 
segments have some priced bundles to satisfy their demand. Figure 10 illustrates the initial 
bundle allocation. The grey shapes represent different bundle types and the numbers inside 
correspond to their initial bundle prices. In the initial distribution, high-income market R buys 3 
doses of complex bundle AB. Since the production capacity of bundle AB is 3 which does not 
adequately satisfy the demand of market R, therefore market R needs to also buy monovalent 
bundles A and B. In the initial allocation, low-income market P only has monovalent bundles.  




Now assume an external party is interested in providing subsidy so that market P has 2 
doses of bundle AB. This requires that market R gives up 2 doses of bundles of AB and switches 
them to market P. Meanwhile market P must swap 2 doses of A and 2 doses of B to market R 
because otherwise market R ends up facing shortage. In Figure 13, the bundles to be swapped are 
highlighted by dashed rectangles. The new allocation after the swap is shown in Figure 14. 
.  
It can be seen from Figure 14 that in the new distribution, all the swapped vaccine 
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Figure 13: Initial vaccine bundle allocation 
Figure 14: Vaccine bundle allocation after swaps 
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more monovalent bundles. The 2 doses of bundle AB originally purchased by market R at 25 
dollars per dose, after swapped to market P, remain at 25 dollars per dose. However, since 
market P would pay a maximum of 12 dollars for each bundle AB, there is a need for a subsidy 
of 13 dollars per dose to allow market P to buy the swapped AB bundles. The total subsidy 
needed to support the illustrated swap is 26 dollars as shown by: 
                                    
For the monovalent bundles swapped from market P to market R, the prices of the 
vaccines are below the reservation prices that market P has for them. Therefore market R can 
accept those bundles without the need of any subsidy. The total subsidy needed to support the 
new vaccine distribution is 26 dollars. 
 
3.3 A goal programming approach to solve the subsidy problem 
This section presents the formulation of the optimization models to determine new bundle 
allocation which solve the subsidy problem. The new bundle allocation must generate maximum 
TSS while requiring minimum subsidy, which corresponds to a multi-objective optimization 
problem. A two-stage goal programming approach is proposed to handle the two objective 
functions by assuming that the minimization on subsidy takes precedence over the maximization 
on TSS. The first stage model determines a new bundle allocation that result in   doses of 
bundle   to be attractive to for sale in market , by minimizing the amount of subsidy required 
to sustain it. The first stage model is referred as the SUBSIDY model in this thesis. 
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After the SUBSIDY model is solved, the resulting minimum subsidy is used as input data 
for the second stage model, which determines the bundle allocation that maximizes the TSS, 
while not exceeding the subsidy resulting from stage 1. The model used in the second stage of 
the goal programming approach is referred as the SWAP model. 
The next two parts presents the mathematical formulation of the SUBSIDY model and 
the SWAP model. 
 
3.3.1 The SUBSIDY model 
The SUBSIDY model defines some of its notations, sets and parameters in a similar way 
as the ABP model [18]. The SUBSIDY model uses   as the set of market segments that 
compose the vaccine market. Types of bundles available in market are included in set  . Set   is 
composed of different types of antigens. In the SUBSIDY model, market segments swap bundles 
among each other with no bundle manufacturer involved. Therefore, set   representing vaccine 
bundle manufacturer in the ABP model is omitted in the SUBSIDY model. 
The following notations are also used to formulate the SUBSIDY model. 
1) Sets  
The following sets are used in the SWAP model (same as in the ABP model). 
    Types of antigens. 
    Types of vaccine bundles. 
    Market segments. 
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        Subset of bundles containing antigen    .  
2) Parameters 
      Number of doses of bundle   that market segment  need to obtain from 
other market segments to satisfy an immunization goal.  
      Reservation price of market  on bundle  . 
      Amount of bundle   initially allocated to market . When ABP optimal 
solution is used as initial input for the subsidy problem, this parameter 
corresponds to the ABP optimal allocation. 
      Initial price per dose of bundle   in market segment . Similarly to    , the 
value of     corresponds to ABP price if the ABP optimal solution is available. 
      Upper bound of price per dose of bundle b in market m. If the subsidy 
problem starts with an ABP optimal solution, then the value of      corresponds 
to the optimal solution of ABP_PF model. Otherwise,     is set equal to    . 
      Demand of market segment  for antigen  . 
     Annual birth rate of market segment m. This parameter and     is used to 
calculate the immunization demand of market segments. 
3) Variables 
       Number of doses of bundle   that is swapped from a supplying market 
segment  to the receiving market segment  . 
       The amount of subsidy required to support swap    . 
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The mathematical formulation of the SUBSIDY model is presented below, followed by a 
detailed explanation on the functions of objective function and constraints.. 
Formulation: The SUBSIDY model. 
                
         
                                                                                                                
           
   
    
   
                                                                                         
    
       
       
           
       
           
                                    
         
   
                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                          




The main objective of the SUBSIDY model is to minimize the total subsidy required to 
induce the new bundle allocation, which is reflected by equation (3.3.1). Notice that the variable 
     which corresponds to bundle swaps is not included in (3.3.1). Therefore,     in the 
optimal solution of the SUBSIDY model corresponds to any swaps that are feasible for the 
SUBSIDY model. 
Constraint (3.3.2) ensures that that after a swap, the low-income market segment gets at 
least the required target amount of the initially desired vaccines. Constraint (3.3.3) guarantees 
that after any swaps, the amount of bundles allocated to each market segment satisfy its 
immunization demand. For each bundle type, a market segment cannot swap out more than the 
amount of doses originally allocated to that market segment, which is guaranteed by constraint 
(3.3.4). Constraint (3.2.5) prevents a market segment swapping bundles to itself. 
For any swap    , when          , which means for bundle  , the original price 
paid by provider market segment  is higher than the upper bound of price that receiver market 
segment   can afford, then a non-negative subsidy      is required to support the swap. The 
value of      also needs be higher than the value of           so that it sufficiently 
sustains swap    . If such a subsidy does not exist then       which implies that the 
swap cannot be executed. Constraint (3.2.6) captures to the above discussion. Constraint (3.2.7) 
ensures that the values of any subsidy or swap are non-negative. 
The solution of the SUBSIDY model gives the values of     
  corresponding to the 
minimum subsidy required that allows bundle   to be swapped from market segment   to 
market segment  . The optimal objective value        
 
          becomes input data for 
the SWAP model in the second stage of the goal programming approach. 
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3.3.2 The SWAP model  
Variable     in an optimal solution of the SUBSIDY model corresponds to a set of 
bundle swaps that are feasible to all constraints in the SUBSIDY model. Therefore, it is possible 
that in the new allocation, many high value complex bundles are swapped to low-income market 
segments while rich market segments receives inexpensive monovalent bundles, which is still 
feasible for the SUBSIDY model. Such an allocation would result in great reduction on the level 
of total social surplus compared with bundle allocation before swaps. 
Besides minimizing the total subsidy, an additional objective of the subsidy problem is 
that the bundle allocation maximizes the total social surplus. The SWAP model is solved in the 
second stage of the goal programming and the solution gives bundle allocation that maximizes 
TSS. Equation (1.4.4) gives the formulation for the maximum TSS in the ABP model [18]. 
                   
         
         
      
                  
Since no vaccine provider is involved in the SWAP model, we eliminate index   which 
identifies each vaccine producer and                is ignored when calculating TSS in the 
SWAP model. Then (1.4.4) is converted to (1.4.4a) in which     
  represents bundle allocation 
after swaps. 
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For any market segment, the number of bundles it has available after swaps is equal to its 
original allocated doses, adding the amount of bundles obtained from other market segment and 
subtracting the amount swapped out. This is illustrated by equation (3.3.8). 
   
           
    
      
   
                  
Then (1.4.4a) is converted to (1.4.4c). 
                        
    
      
   
 
      
                   
Since     is known, for the subsidy problem the bundle allocation are considered as 
parameter,                is constant which can be ignored in (1.4.4c). Therefore, equation 
(3.3.9) corresponds to the maximum total social surplus generated by allocation after swaps, 
which is used as the objective function of the SWAP model. 
                    
    
      
   
 
      
                  
The variables in (3.3.9) are     and     corresponding to bundle swaps. Therefore, 
the SWAP model optimizes bundle swaps while the SUBSIDY model optimizes subsidy. 
The SWAP model keeps all constraints from the SUBSIDY model, with one additional 
constraint given by equation (3.3.10) 
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In (3.3.10), the right-hand-side parameter            corresponds to the optimal 
objective value of the SUBSIDY model. Constraint (3.3.10) guarantees that any bundle 
allocation generated by SWAP can be supported by a subsidy no more expensive than the 
minimum subsidy passed from the first stage of the goal programming approach. 
The mathematical formulation of the SWAP model is presented as below. 
Formulation: The SWAP model. 
                    
    
      
   
 
      
                                                                         
       
         
                                                                                                                   
           
   
    
   
                                                                                         
    
       
       
           
       
           
                                    
         
   
                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                          




3.3.3 Summary on how to solve the subsidy problem 
The SUBSIDY model and the SWAP model solve the subsidy problem by generating 
    
  corresponding to optimal bundle swaps to induce a new vaccine allocation that maximizes 
TSS, as well as     
  corresponding to the minimum amount of required subsidy that supports    
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Optimal solution 





Figure 15: How to solve the subsidy problem 
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3.4 Computational results 
In this section, a computational example is used to illustrate how the subsidy problem is solved. 
Four different market segments are included: rich, medium, low-income and poorest market 
segments. Multiple types of bundles are available in the market, which are categorized based on 
the complexity. The available bundle categories are very expensive 4-antigen bundles, expensive 
3-antigen bundles, inexpensive 2-antigen bundles as well as the least expensive monovalent 
bundles. The reservation price at each market segment for the different bundles is shown as in 
Figure 16. 
 
Reservation Price in $USD 
Market Segments Monovalent Bundle 2-antigen Bundle 3-antigen Bundle 4-antigen Bundle 
Rich 24 60 100 140 
Medium 6 15 25 35 
Low-income 2 6 10 14 
Poorest 1 2 3 5 
Figure 16: Market segment's reservation price on bundles 
Figure 16 shows a stronger preference by richer market segments for more complex 
bundles. Therefore, bundle allocation generates high total social surplus by assigning complex 
bundles to rich markets. So the initial bundle allocation and prices are as shown in Figure 17, in 
which more complex bundles are assigned to the richer market segment. 













30 doses 40 doses 60 doses 120 doses 
Figure 17: Initial bundle allocation and prices 
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Assume that it is required that the poorest market must have 30 doses of most complex 4-
antigen bundles. This resulting problem can be solved by the proposed two-stage goal 
programming approach. Figure 18 illustrates the solution generated by the SUBSIDY model. 
 
 
In Figure 18, by requirement the rich market swaps all 30 doses of complex 4-antigen 
bundles to the poorest market. The gap between the 4-antigen bundle price and poorest market’s 
reservation price is USD$ 85 per dose. Therefore, USD$ 2550 of subsidy are required to support 
the swap of 30 bundles. With 30 doses of 4-antigen bundles taken away, the rich market faces 
bundle insufficiency. Therefore the poorest market must simultaneously swap 120 doses of 
monovalent bundles to the rich market segment. The transfer of monovalent bundles to the rich 
market segment does not require subsidy support. 













30 doses  













120 doses  
Subsidy = 0 
Rich Medium Low-income Poorest 
Figure 18: Solution of the first stage model 
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The resulting USD$ 2550 corresponding to the minimized subsidy then becomes input 
data for the SWAP model. Figure 19 illustrates solution generated by the second stage model. 
 
From Figure 19, it can be seen that in order to maximize TSS, the SWAP model swaps 
more complex bundles to richer market segments. All swaps in SWAP solution do not require 
subsidy support. Figure 19 shows the final bundle allocation in which poorest market has 30 
doses of 4-antigen bundle as desired. The minimum amount of subsidy needed to achieve such 



























Rich Medium Low-income Poorest 
Final bundle allocation 
Subsidy = 0 
40 doses 
Subsidy = 0 
60 doses 
Subsidy = 0 
120 doses 
Figure 19: Bundle swaps in the second stage solution 
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3.5 A variation on the subsidy problem. 
When the subsidy problem starts from an initial allocation in which the demands of all market 
segments are satisfied, then the goal programming procedure generates new allocation that 
satisfies all market segments. However, if in the initial allocation the total amount of allocable 
bundle does not satisfy the overall demand of all market segments, then merely swapping 
bundles results in a new allocation in which one or more market segments will still face bundle 
insufficiency. Therefore, this section proposes a method to handle such a situation by making 
small changes on the input data of the SUBSIDY model and the SWAP model. 
3.5.1 Solve subsidy problem with supply insufficiency 
External bundle provider must exist in order to fill the gap between overall bundle supply 
and bundle demand in the initial allocation, while neither the SWAP model nor the SUBSIDY 
model is designed to formulate bundle producers. However, the problem can be resolved by 
tweaking the input data of the SUBSIDY and SWAP model so that the external bundle provider 
can be modeled as a dummy market segment. The dummy market segment must have the 
following characters. 
 The amount of bundles initially allocated to the dummy market segment must 
sufficiently cover the overall bundle shortage in the initial allocation. 
 Reservation prices of the dummy market for any type of bundle must be zero. 
This is to guarantee that bundles are not swapped to the dummy market segment 
for increase of TSS. 
 The demand of dummy market segment on any bundle is zero. 
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Additionally, it is assumed for any         which is the number of bundle   originally 
allocated to the dummy market segment, the corresponding bundle price is illustrated by 
equation (3.5.1) 
              
                                     
       
                  
In (3.5.1),   is a input parameter representing an desired percentage on return of 
investment for producing bundle  . Equation (3.5.1) makes sure that the external bundle 
producer provides a bundle only when the bundle price is attractive. 
After the initial bundle allocation, reservation price and demand are decided for the 
dummy market segment, the dummy market segment is integrated with other market segments to 
construct a scenario for the subsidy problem. Then the same goal programming approach 
introduced in Section 3.3 can be used to solve the problem and find out optimal swap    
  as 
well as minimum subsidy     
 . The next section shows an experimentation of solving subsidy 
problem with dummy market segment included.  
 
3.5.2 Experimentation results 
In this experiment, the available bundle types as well as each market segment’s demand 
and reservation price for bundles are the same as the data presented in Figure 6, 7, 8 and 9 in 
section 2.4. Figure 20 shows the initial bundle allocation for the subsidy problem. Notice that in 
Figure 20, market segment 5 is the dummy market segment corresponding to bundle provider.  
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Figure 20: Initial bundle allocation and prices 
 
From Figure 20, we can see that market segment 4 corresponding to the poorest market 
segments does not have enough bundles to satisfy its vaccine demand. Therefore, additional 
bundles must be provided by the dummy market segment corresponding to the external bundle 
provider. Additionally, it is assumed that the poorest market segment must have 10 million doses 
of bundle DTaP-HBV-HiB-IPV, which is the most expensive complex bundle. 
Then the two-stage goal programming approach is used to solve the described problem. 
Figure 21 shows the solution generated by the SUBSIDY model. 
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Figure 21: Solution of the SUBSIDY model 
 
From Figure 21, we can see that in the solution generated by the SUBSIDY model, the 
poorest market segment has 10 million doses of DtaP-HBV-HiB-IPV bundle, in which 8 million 
doses is contributed by the middle-income market segment, while 2 million are transferred from 
the dummy market segment. In order to avoid expensive subsidy, the model chose to swap 
bundle DtaP-HBV-HiB-IPV from middle-income market segment instead of rich market 
segment, since the original price of this bundle is much higher in the rich market segment. The 
total amount of subsidy required is $USD 154,820,000.  
Figure 21 also shows that monovalent bundles have been swapped to the middle-income 
market segment to substitute the combination vaccines swapped to the poorest market segment. 
The demand of all market segments are satisfied by the allocation illustrated in Figure 21. 
Then the value of minimum subsidy is passed to the SWAP model to find out optimal 
bundle allocation that maximizes the TSS. Figure 22 shows the solution of the SWAP model. 
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Figure 22: Solution of the SWAP model 
 
From Figure 22, it can be seen that the SWAP model maximizes by transfer more 
complex bundles to richer market segments. For example, bundle HBV-HiB is swapped from the 
poorest market to the low-income market, while low-income market segment has swapped tri-
antigen bundles to the middle-income market segments. The solution of the SWAP model gives 
the swaps that induce the final bundle allocation in which the demand of all market segments are 
satisfied and the poorest market segment has 10 million doses of bundle DTaP-HBV-HiB-IPV. 




4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis presents the author’s research work at RIT from the September 2008 to July 2011. 
During the first two years, the author’s research focused on looking for a way to reduce the time 
needed to solve the ABP problem and find out optimal bundle allocation and prices. Attempted 
methodologies include auction models, game theory models as well as dynamic programming 
approach, which all showed limitations. Linearization of the ABP model has also been 
attempted, which brings more variables into the formulation and hence limits its application. The 
author then successfully developed a heuristics approach to separate the ABP problem into 
sequential small problems and use the ABP_R(i) model to solve each of the small problems, and 
eventually solves the ABP problem. Compared with the ABP model, the heuristics method 
reduces the solution time to 1/300 while generating TSS that is 99.93% of original. Since year 
2010, the author has been working on the development of an optimization model to decide the 
minimum subsidy needed to enable poor countries to have expensive combination vaccines. The 
ABP model does not include subsidy in the scope. Therefore in the solution of the ABP model, 
poor market segments always have monovalent vaccines or less complex combination vaccines. 
However include the subsidy into the ABP model would result in more variables in the 
formulation which is MINLP and eventually leads to prolonged solving time. So, the thesis 
focused on constructing Linear Programming models that can use the solution of the ABP model 
as an initial input. The research results in the SUBSIDY model and the SWAP model which 
successfully solves the subsidy problem. In the computational experiment presented in section 
3.5, it is assumed that external vaccine manufacturer is willing to provide complex bundle at the 
price of $USD 30 per dose. Purchasing 10 million doses of such bundle for the poorest market 
segment requires a subsidy of USD$ 300,000,000. The solution of the proposed goal 
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programming approach shows that the same objective can be achieved by swapping some of the 
complex bundles from other market segments, while requiring a subsidy of only $USD 
154,820,000 which corresponds to a 50% reduction. 
More research work can be done which will potentially further reduce the required 
amount of subsidy. The SUBSIDY model and SWAP model presented in this thesis treat price of 
bundles as fixed parameter. However, when transferring an inexpensive bundle from a poorer 
market segment to a richer market segment, since the richer market segment have higher 
reservation price on the transferred bundle, it is possible to allow bundle price to be increased. 
Then the additional revenue generated by increasing bundle price can be part of the total subsidy 
and thus reduce the amount of subsidy required from external donors. The author of this thesis is 
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